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Combat Motivation and the 
Roots of Fanaticism 
The 12th SS Panzer Division 
Hitlerjugend in Nor111andy 
Michael E. Sullivan 
l"' Tar veterans generally retain a grudging 
VV respect towards their old enemy. 
Statements like, "I hold no ill will against them," 
or "They were only doing their jobs" are 
commonplace. However, no one makes these 
statements about the 12th SS Panzer Division 
Hitlerjugend. More often than not, the sentiment 
of Allied veterans towards the 12th SS is one of 
revulsion and hate. Even the Germans thought 
they were a particularly nasty bunch. Raised in 
1943 from selected members of the Hitler Youth 
who were born in 1926, the rank and file of the 
12th SS had been the first children to 'volunteer' 
for compulsory service in the Hitler Youth on 
his birthday in 1936. In the aftermath of 
Stalingrad this priviledged cadre of 17 and 18 
year-old Nazis was then targeted for a special 
division to be led by battle-hardened veterans 
of the 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte 
Adolf Hitler (LAH). During the Normandy 
campaign of 1944 the 12th SS gained an 
unenviable reputation for brutality and 
fanaticism, much of that directed at the 
Canadians who fought them first and met them 
repeatedly throughout that summer. What 
follows here is an attempt to explain why the 
12th SS was so very different from the other 
Axis divisions, even other SS ones, that the Allies 
faced in Europe. 
Simply put, the main reason for the unique 
(and abominable) actions of the 12th SS lay in 
their combat motivation. The motivating factors 
of any soldier are numerous, complex, and never 
static. Anthony Kellett was the first to really focus 
on the holistic and situational nature of combat 
motivation, which he defined as: 
the conscious or unconscious calculation by the 
combat soldier of the material and spiritual 
benefits and costs likely to be attached to various 
courses of action arising from his assigned 
combat tasks. Hence motivation comprises the 
influences that bear on a soldier's choice of, 
degree of commitment to, and persistence in 
effecting, a certain course of action. 1 
The task in this case is to try to determine what 
influences bore on the 12th SS soldier's "choice 
of, degree of commitment to, and persistence in 
effecting" their course of action, both on and off 
the battlefield. 
The 12th SS inAction 
~ere is no doubt that the actions of the 12th 
~ SS were viewed as unacceptable by their 
opponents. An investigation by the Supreme 
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force 
(SHAEF) Court of Inquiry determined that "the 
conduct of the 12th SS Panzer Division (Hitler-
Jugend) presented a consistent pattern of 
brutality and ruthlessness." Significantly, this 
view was also shared by the 12th SS's German 
comrades. The SHAEF report stated that the 
12th SS gained for itself "a most unsavory 
reputation, even among the rest of the German 
Armed Forces, [which] is evident from the fact 
that German prisoners taken, admit that it was 
called the 'Murder Division. '"2 A member of the 
Polish Army also recorded that the 12th SS had 
a general reputation among the German troops 
as being reckless and murders. 3 Grenadier 
George Mertens, a member of the 26th Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment, one of the two infantry 
regiments of the 12th SS, claimed that he did 
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Soldiers from the 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend photographed during the early stages of the Normandy 
campaign. Atrocities commited by men from this unit led to it being referred to as "the murder division." 
not know that they had a bad reputation until might possibly be attributed to drugs. "9 Another 
he heard it in a prison camp. His reaction was member of the North Nova Scotia Highlanders 
"I could hardly believe it." In retrospect, though, who survived capture by the 12th SS stated: 
he believed that the label was deserved, and he 
also admitted that he heard the term "Murder 
Division" in his company.4 
There is no doubt that the label of"Murder 
Division" was entirely justified. Howard 
Margolian documented the murder of 156 
Canadian prisoners of war at the hands of the 
12th SS during the Normandy campaign. 5 In one 
instance, soldiers of the 12th SS shot at a group 
of 40 Canadian prisoners in a field near the 
Caen-Fontenayroad on 8 June 1944, killing 35.6 
In another case, after shooting eight unarmed 
Canadian prisoners in Authie on 7 June 1944, 
soldiers from the 12th SS pulled their bodies 
onto the road and ran over the corpses with 
tanks. 7 Even simply being captured by the Hitler 
Youth was a deeply disturbing experience. Major 
J.D. Learmont of the North Nova Scotia 
Highlanders described them as "wildly excited 
and erratic."8 He noted that they "shouted and 
screamed and behaved in an exceedingly 
disorderly manner. Their actions were such as 
44 
They behaved like maniacs, firing their weapons 
indiscriminately and acted as if they had been 
doped, their faces were flushed and they danced 
and jumped around in a very amazing manner. 
I was with a group of about l 0 men, some being 
of my platoon and others from "A" company and 
we were literally chased across a field, the 
Germans firing the sub machine guns at our 
heels and shouting and acting like Indians. 10 
If their actions were not disturbing enough, 
it seemed that the soldiers who were a part of 
these atrocities were proud of their 
"accomplishments." For example, Unter-
sturmjilhrer Karl-Walter Becker, a member of 
the reconnaissance battalion attached to the 12th 
SS said: 
I asked [Obersturmjiihrer] Palm who had 
committed this act [of shooting POWs] and was 
told that it had been Oberscharfiihrer Stun and 
men of the M/C DR section. Stun had been 
particularly eager to distinguish himself by 
committing this atrocity. 11 
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Other members of the Wehrmacht also noted 
this arrogance among the 12th SS. A member 
of the 271st Infantry Division stated that he ran 
into members of the 12th SS who informed him 
that they had shot five or six Canadian POWs, 
and that the "Canadians had apparently asked 
the Nazis not to shoot, but as Preining's 
informant jocularly remarked 'a machine pistol 
fired by accident. '" 12 
There have been recent attempts made by 
revisionist historians, most notably Karl H. 
Theile, to place the actions of the 12th SS in a 
different light. Theile describes the actions of 
the 12th SS as retaliation for actions of Canadian 
soldiers on 25 June 1944 at Fontenay, although 
no specific examples of Canadian atrocities were 
given. Theile also claimed that many of the 
alleged occurrences were "twisted, exaggerated 
or simply made-up tales." This, of course, goes 
against every shred of evidence that can be 
uncovered. Theile's error is even more glaring 
when it becomes evident that most of the 
atrocities of the 12th SS occurred in the first 
two weeks of the invasion, well before the date 
given for the alleged Canadian atrocities. 13 
The 12th SS did not receive their reputation 
for being fanatical solely because of their actions 
against their prisoners. Rather, they gained the 
label of fanatical also as a result of their actions 
during battle. The soldiers of the 12th SS were 
informed by their officers that they were "not to 
give themselves up and must commit suicide if 
there is no other choice left. "14 This order was 
one of the so-called secret orders given to the 
12th SS weeks before the invasion began. The 
authenticity of these orders has been disputed, 
but there is considerable evidence that orders 
similar to these were given. What is clear is that 
the soldiers of the 12th SS internalized this 
notion, along with the years of ideological 
indoctrination that they were subject to, and 
transferred these beliefs onto the battlefield. ss-
Brigadejilhrer Kurt Meyer, who eventually 
became commander of the 12th SS, and who 
was later convicted by a Canadian court of war 
crimes, once described a fanatic that he had 
observed in Russia: 
Bitter fighting is going on, especially on the right 
of the road. Here a young, spirited commissar 
is spurring his unit on again and again. It is not 
only his yelling which fires his men, but also his 
Two soldiers from 12th SS captured by the Canadians during the fighting for Buran, 7 July 1944. 
Though their war is finished, these wounded soldiers remain defiant as they glare at the camera while 
marching in step to the prisoner of war cage. 
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bold example which keeps them coming on. I 
shall never forget the last picture of this man 
pulled up to his full height. throwing his last 
grenades at Mahl"s section. Even so he solemnly 
drops the last one to the ground in front of him 
and covers it with his body. A quick lift and a 
shudder of the body, a fall of the shattered 
corpse, that is the end of a fanatic. 15 
Meyer's description is surprisingly similar to the 
actions of the boys who fought under his 
command in Normandy. During the battles 
around Falaise, Meyer noted that they "all know 
that the battle can only end with death or 
capture, but nobody is ready to stop fighting. "16 
Manv of the soldiers would not accept capture 
as a~ alternative to death or dishonour. When 
Untersturrrifilhrer Reinhold Fuss and a few 
members of his platoon found themselves 
trapped in a church cemetery by the Canadians 
they "prepared for defence to the last." However, 
the Canadians just left them alone, since nobody 
wanted to risk their lives trying to capture a few 
fanatical teenagers who would, in all likelihood, 
not surrender without a fight. This proved to be 
a shrewd decision, because the SS soldiers had 
no intentions of surrendering. The Germans 
took turns working at digging a hole through a 
stone wall with a bayonet. After six days, without 
food and water, they had dug a hole big enough 
to escape, which they did during the night. 17 
Where escape was not an option for the 12th 
SS, death was usually the end. For example, SS-
Mann Alfred Matthei. a member of the 2nd 
Engineer Training Battalion, noted that when he 
was taken prisoner by the Canadians, most of 
his comrades "declared they would fight to the 
last man." 18 The War Diary of 1st Battalion of 
The Canadian Scottish Regiment recorded an 
incident during the fighting for Point 168 on 15 
August 1944 when one young grenadier 
committed suicide instead of being captured. 19 
Perhaps the most disturbing example of this type 
of attitude by the 12th SS occurred during the 
final battles around Falaise, when a group of 50 
to 60 Grenadiers were forced behind the walls 
of a school. A systematic Canadian attack on 
the school began after weaker attempts had 
failed. None of the 12th SS soldiers wanted to 
leave to report their situation, even though they 
all knew that remaining in their position meant 
death or capture. So the group drew lots to see 
who would be unlucky enough to carry the 
message and live. Eventually, the stronghold was 
eliminated, and there were only four prisoners 
left to be taken by the Canadians. Meyer called 
it "an outstanding example of the gallantry and 
willingness to sacrifice themselves."20 It is more 
properly seen as the act of teenagers who were 
systematically moulded into fanatical fighters by 
years of indoctrination by the Nazi leadership. 
Dejected soldiers from the 12th SS captured by 3rd Canadian Infantry Division in Normandy stand beh.in.d barbed 
wire. Their camoflage uniforms which distinguished them from other German forces are clearly VISible. 
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For the officers and men of the 12th SS, there 
was a certain kind of romance to be found in 
the battlefield. The interrogators of Kurt Meyer 
noted: 
To [Meyer] the battle of Caen-Falaise was 
magnificent in the best Wagnerian tradition. As 
he described his actions and those of his men, 
it seemed as though he liked to consider himself 
as Siegfried leading his warriors to their death. 
When he described how he came out of the 
Falaise Gap with sixty men, it is likely that the 
familiar strains of the "Twilight of the Gods" were 
echoing in his ears. 21 
Even so, romantic notions of Wagnerian death 
in battle do not explain the positively brutal 
fighting espoused by the members of the 12th 
SS. One report stated: 
Later in the evening, the outstanding 46th Royal 
Marine Commando attacked the hand-picked 
boys of the Hitlerjugend. "They fought like lions 
on both sides. The dead were lying body to body," 
wrote the historians of the Chaudieres 
[Regiment] who reached the village the next 
morning. "We searched every house, every yard, 
to prevent ambushes. That is the confirmation 
of how brutal the fighting oflast night must have 
been. The commandos were lying dead in rows 
next to the dead SS-men. Hand grenades were 
scattered everywhere in the streets and front 
doors of the houses. At one spot we saw a 
commando and an SS-man who died virtually 
arm-in-arm, one killing the other. At another spot 
we found a German and a Canadian tank, having 
crushed each other. They were still smoking and 
from each of the smoke-blackened turrets hung 
the dead bodies of the machine gunners. Over 
there was a squad which had run toward a small 
wall to seek cover. They had been shot down 
before they reached it. And then, at the church, 
as the vanguard of"C" Company and the Carettes 
swung around the corner, they encountered three 
Germans. Only three. But one of them 
immediately drew his pistol and hit one of our 
men. A machine gunner killed two of the three 
SS-men, but the survivor did not surrender. He 
tricked us and disappeared. Now you will 
understand what fanatics we were fighting. 22 
Kurt Meyer even stated that he knew of at least 
three separate cases between 9 June 1944 and 
7 July 1944 when one of his men tied explosives 
to his body and jumped onto an Allied tank to 
destroy it. 23 No man, let alone a teenage boy, will 
do that instinctively unless he has been 
instructed and indoctrinated into a fanatical style 
of fighting. 
The Origins of Fanaticism 
T he origins of such a fanatical combat motivation are complex, but Margolian is 
correct in bringing attention to the role that the 
1st SS officers had on the development of the 
12th SS as a fighting force. The link between 
competent officers and motivated soldiers is 
reflected throughout the historical and social 
scientific literature. In the sociological 
examination of this particular relationship, Dean 
Havron and Joseph McGrath determined that 
leader intelligence, knowledge and 
implementation of job skills, and a sense ofthe 
feelings of their men by the officer are key to the 
performance and motivation of a unit. The higher 
these factors are present in a leader, the more 
likely the unit will be highly motivated and 
effective. 24 Kellett determined that a soldier will 
obey and follow a leader if they meet their 
expectations, which many generally do. The 
more they meet these expectations, the more 
motivated the soldiers are in following them into 
battle. He also found that the most effective form 
of leadership is through example. Following a 
leader is easier for the soldier than fulfilling 
orders while their officers watch them from a 
distance. 
Finally, Kellett concluded that an important 
way for soldiers to increase their combat 
motivation was through modelling oneself after 
a successful leader. Kellett also asserted that the 
effectiveness of the Wehrmacht was a result of 
the presence of these qualities within the 
leadership of the German Army during the 
Second World War. 25 These exact qualities were 
quite evident, and purposely strived for, by the 
officers of the 12th SS. Accordingly, if the officer 
of a unit embodied the characteristics of an 
excellent soldier, their example would definitely 
reflect upon the combat motivation of their unit. 
John Keegan identified the presence of the "Big 
Man" as one of the vital elements in the combat 
motivation of a soldier. The presence in a unit 
of a soldier who appears to be the embodiment 
of the perceived ideal soldier, the one who "brings 
combat alive" through his actions on the field, 
will positively affect the motivation of a soldier. 
Another key element of Keegan's theory of 
combat motivation was that of mimicry, which 
can be defined as the efforts of a soldier in an 
attempt to emulate the actions of the "Big Man." 
47 
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For the soldiers of the 12th SS, the "Big Man" of 
their unit was their officer, and there was a 
consistent effort on the part of the average soldier 
to imitate their leaders within every aspect of 
training and combat. 26 The bitter fighting in the 
Russian campaign that the soldiers in the 1st 
SS (LAH) experienced would have definitely 
influenced the way that the officers of the 12th 
SS led their men. This highly developed brutal 
ethos of fighting was transferred to the formative 
minds of the teenagers they led to battle, youth 
whose years of ideological indoctrination was 
immediately validated by the words and the 
actions of their officers. For these boys, being 
led by the heros and former members of"Hitler's 
Fire Brigade" would be akin to a midget hockey 
player playing on a line with Wayne Gretzky and 
Mario Lemieux. 
Along with the sense of pride that came with 
fighting alongside their heros, whom they did 
not want to disappoint, came the added 
motivator of being a part of the SS. Blackburn 
noted that "the creation of the cult of the Nazi 
SS elite was a result of Hitler's effort to "minister" 
to the psychic ills of his more fanatical followers. 
Unable to face the postwar world without 
direction, Heinrich Himmler and his wayward 
brawlers, searching desperately for some truth, 
followed a leader who would make everything 
come out alright. "27 This dependence on Hitler 
for their identity meant that the most radical 
aspects of the National Socialist 
Weltanschauung (world view) were internalized 
by the men of the SS. Realizing the potential that 
this group would have in the acquisition, 
consolidation, and maintenance of power, the 
National Socialist leadership strove to harness 
their energy and mindless devotion. 
SS education consisted of moulding the 
mentality of the man. The basic attitude strived 
for was that the SS man should be a fighter for 
fighting's sake, which was known as "heroic 
realism." The soldier had to obey 
unquestioningly, had to be hard and impervious 
to all human emotions, be contemptuous of 
"inferior beings," show comradeship and 
camaraderie, and believe that the word 
"impossible" did not exist. However, the spirit 
of combat efficiency was the real governing 
principle in the SS. The "hardness" trait of the 
SS man was key, and it was viewed on two levels. 
On the ideological level, the concept of hardness 
48 
evolved from National Socialist concepts of 
inhumanity, mercilessness, and savagery. On the 
military level, the fighting nature of the SS 
demanded that its men should have no 
hesitation in shedding either his own blood or 
the blood of foreigners. 28 As a result of their 
education, the SS soldier would have 
internalized the fact that their life belonged to 
"the German kingdom," available for use in any 
way to protect the National Socialist 
Weltanschauung. 29 The SS man would have also 
known that he was indeed a part of an elite 
organization at the apex of German society, 30 a 
feeling that would have translated itself into the 
motivation on the battlefield. 
Elite Status and Symbols 
Since the Hitler Youth, through the years of resocialization and ideological 
indoctrination, embodied the qualities that the 
SS wanted, the SS were quite eager to recruit 
the Hitler Youth into their ranks and transmit 
their own radicalized values to their new 
recruits. Although at first the German army 
officials would not permit active recruitment of 
the Hitler Youth by the SS, by 1934 they allowed 
volunteers in reserve units to go with the SS (still 
a small Nazi party Preatorian guard) if there were 
no pressing army needs. This essentially gave 
Himmler all the justification that he needed to 
form a strong bond with the Hitler Youth in order 
to siphon off its members to the ranks of his 
private army. He instructed his SS leaders to 
initiate and preserve good relations with Hitler 
Youth leaders, and systematic Hitler Youth 
recruitment was discussed as early as 1935. A 
feeling emerged that the SS would be the 
preferred destination for the best of the Hitler 
Youth graduates, a sort of transfer from one elite 
Party formation to the other. The stringent 
conditions imposed on joining the SS created 
"an aura of preferment" that made it easy to 
attract and foster loyalty and dedication by those 
who were lucky enough to be accepted. 31 When 
the SS began recruitment for the 12th SS, the 
standards were so high that it was certain that 
only the elite members of the Hitler Youth who 
were eligible would be accepted. 
The elite status of the 12th SS in the German 
military was constantly stressed to its men. In 
his speech to future members of the division at 
their graduation from the Wehrertilch-
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tigungslager der Hitler-Jugend (Hitler Youth 
Military Instruction Camps - WEL [see below]) 
in 1943, Artur Axmann stated: 
You are the elite of German youth ... .In your unit, 
my comrades, the soldierly tradition of the Hitler 
Youth will find its ultimate expression. That is 
the reason why all German youths direct their 
attention to this unit, to you; that is why the 
honour of German youth depends on you. 
Axmann was followed by Himmler, who echoed 
this sentiment: 
In these weeks, when the sacrifice ofStalingrad 
was on everyone's mind, when the Russians 
mounted massive attacks, your Youth Leader 
made the decision to offer to the Fuhrer the best 
young boys of the new class for a new Waffen SS 
division. The Fuhrer agreed happily .... After a 
few months in SS barracks you will enter a great 
formation .... You will then train some more, lose 
many drops of sweat in order to save drops of 
blood and finally will march alongside its sister 
division, the Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler. You 
will carry the name that the Fuhrer gave you: 
SS Panzer Grenadier Division "Hitler-Jugend. "32 
These were explicit appeals to the boys' idealism 
and further emphasis of their eliteness. In the 
process, they would have also increased the 
desire for the boys to 
get out into the 
battlefield and live ~ 
up to their elite ~ 
status, thereby~ 





ing the naming and 
the symbols of the 
division contributed 
to the combat 
motivation of the 
12th SS. Along with 
the 1st SS, the 12th 
SS was a part of the 
ISS Panzer Corps, a 
formation that was 
already serving on 
These two photos show 
Hitler Youth Rallys in 
Germany before the war. 
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A dead SS trooper lies in the street in Falaise, 17-18 August 1944. The soldiers of the I SS Panzer Corps were the 
only Germans allowed to wear the words "Adolf Hitler" (visible just above the cuff) on their sleeves. 
the Russian front but whose title was re-assigned 
to this new formation in Normandy to signify an 
even greater sense of eliteness. 33 Both the 1st 
SS and the 12th SS were the only formations to 
carry Hitler's name in their divisional title, an 
honour that they subsequently wore on their 
arms. Added to the symbolic similarities of the 
two divisions were their emblems. The crest of 
the 12th SS was that of the 1st SS with a rune 
intersecting the skeleton key at the centre of the 
crest. According to Hubert Meyer, through these 
symbols the 12th SS was able to achieve a greater 
cohesiveness, both within the division and within 
the ISS Panzer Corps, and confirmed for the 
Hitler Youth that they were "equal to their 
comrades of the Leibstandarte,"34 thereby 
creating another powerful motivator. 
The uniform worn by the soldiers ofthe 12th 
SS was also designed to motivate. Each member 
had at least a partial camouflage uniform, a 
relative luxury which made it hard to spot a 12th 
SS soldier in the field, but also made them 
distinctive in a crowd. 35 Both the officers and 
the recruits wore the same outfit, and this 
50 
combined with the relative youthfulness of the 
officer corp meant that it was virtually 
impossible to tell the enlisted men from the 
officers. 36 Apart from giving the soldiers an 
advantage over their German comrades who did 
not possess the camouflaged uniforms, the boys 
in the 12th SS would have felt a sense of pride 
that they were alike in appearance with their 
heros, thereby increasing their combat 
motivation. 37 
The combat motivation of the division was 
further enhanced by an elevated sense of unit 
esprit. This often comes about as a result of unit 
history and tradition,38 and the 12th SS used 
their common experiences in the Hitler Youth 
and in the WELs and the influence of their SS 
officers to quickly come together and develop a 
unit bond that was defined by the fanaticism that 
each soldier felt towards Hitler and Nazi 
Germany. Kurt Meyer testified that "for their 
fighting motto the soldiers were given the 
idealistic point of view of soldierhood, in brief; 
'I am nothing, we are everything.' The entire 
troops were looked upon as one unit. "39 The 
9
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soldiers recognized that the morale in their unit 
was high, and they truly believed themselves to 
be excellent soldiers, even superior to their own 
German counterparts. 40 
Training & the Hitler Youth 
I\ unique aspect ofthe division that would give 
.L"\its soldiers an even greater combat 
motivation was its training. The first element was 
emphasis on physical fitness. Even before 
entering the 12th SS, the teenage recruits had 
already undergone extensive physical training. 
Professional youth leaders and educators in the 
Third Reich placed physical fitness above 
intellectual training in their educational 
curriculum.41 Physical education was seen as a 
fundamental and inseparable part of National 
Socialist education, as long as it was done under 
the direction of the National Socialist 
Weltanschauung. 42 As a result, physical 
education classes began to take over the school's 
schedule. The normal timetable allocation for 
gym classes went from two to three in 1936, and 
from three to five in 1938.43 Eventually, the Hitler 
Youth took over the planning of sports and 
sporting events, and the sports eventually took 
a militaristic tone. One of the favourite sports 
was rifle marksmanship, and by 1938 the Hitler 
Youth had over 1,250,000 participants in 
marksmanship. 44 Even within the division, a 
sporting program was set up, under the guidance 
of the Nazi Guidance Officer (NSFO - see 
below). 45 The result of all of this emphasis on 
sport was a group of teenagers who were 
physically fit and able to handle the strain of 
military life, thereby producing a more content 
and motivated soldier. 
Another unique element in the training of 
the 12th SS was the universal paramilitary 
training for Hitler Youth boys between the ages 
of 16 and 18. Starting in early 1942, these boys 
entered the WELs which "proved to be a 
successful innovation in terms of meeting what 
the Nazis felt to be necessary psychological 
conditioning for military combat. In a way, they 
were ideologically charged basic training camps, 
less pragmatic, technical, and brutal than such 
camps for older draftees usually are, but more 
effective in fostering the attitudes that make 
military service more than a tolerable endurance 
test. "46 Camp directors were primarily wounded 
army officers and Waffen-SS veterans, and 
trainers were army and Waffen-SS NCOs with 
either reserve status or temporary domestic 
assignments. The first WEL training cycle began 
on 10 May 1942, and by the end of 1943 nearly 
every boy of seventeen had undergone 
paramilitary training. The SS took over full 
control of many of the camps from the army, 
and thereby had ample opportunity to recruit 
from these camps into the Waffen-SSY 
The quality and diversity of the WEL training 
also served to further motivate the average boy 
who passed through its gates. As Rempel pointed 
out: 
The curriculum of the WELs incorporated an 
exaggerated Darwinian ideology infused with the 
youthful elan of the HJ, physical exercises 
highlighting its combative ethos, and the basic 
techniques of war making .... [The] emphasis on 
orderliness helped to instill a sense of discipline, 
unquestioning obedience, and clear 
subordination. "Troop-like drills" were avoided, 
not only because they were inappropriate for 
young boys, but also because they were less 
practical than exercises designed to instill 
martial attitudes .... [E]ndurance and toughness 
were the primary goals. 48 
The military aspects of the WEL training were 
quite elaborate. Nearly half of the instruction 
time allotted was spent on terrain exercises, such 
as night training, patrolling, and terrain games. 
Use and care of small calibre weapons took up 
one quarter of the training time, and because of 
the successful nature of this training in the WEL, 
the army shortened its weapons training 
component in their basic training. Finally, 
physical exercise, first aid training, and general 
housekeeping, coupled with the ideological 
training, rounded out the schedule. 
Ideological Preparation 
I t must be remembered that first and foremost, the WELs were military in nature, but the 
importance in examining and understanding the 
scope of the ideological aspects of these camps 
is key to understanding the later actions of the 
boys of the 12th SS. Ideology, as it was presented 
in the WELs, was styled to strengthen basic Nazi 
precepts. A uniform lecture prepared in Berlin 
and distributed to the WEL camps was given to 
the boys each week, and events like lectures, 
elaborate patriotic ceremonies, a nightly 
"political hour" (where trainees were asked 
51 
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questions about the current political situations 
and their relation to National Socialist ideology), 
and discussions all were designed to have the 
maximum psychological impact. Among the 
weekly mottos were "We Fight," "We Sacrifice," 
and "We Triumph," and the various lectures were 
all geared around the week's motto. Although 
formal indoctrination only took up 14 hours out 
of a total training schedule of 166, ideology 
"permeated the entire curriculum whether it was 
implemented in the barracks, on the shooting 
range, exercise area, or the field. "49 Through their 
involvement in the WEL, coupled with the 
education received at the hands of the Nazified 
educational system and within the structure of 
the Hitler Youth, many of the youth proved to be 
high-quality recruits, 5° thereby adding to their 
already inflated sense of eliteness. 
The ideological training did not stop with 
the soldiers' transfer to the battlefield. Indeed, 
considerable emphasis was placed on enhancing 
combat motivation through intense ideological 
training. The officer with the most profound and 
direct impact on the ideological indoctrination 
of the 12th SS was the Abt. VI of the Divisional 
General Staff, the Nationalsozialistischer 
Filhrungsojjizier (NSFO - Nazi Guidance 
Officer). The NSFO evolved from the crisis of 
motivation that occurred in the Eastern Front. 
It was the responsibility of the NSFO and his 
staff, under the mandate of "troop care" 
(Truppenbetreuung), to distribute ideological 
materials to the troops. On 16 December 1943 
Brigadejilhrer Fritz Witt, the first commander 
of the 12th SS, issued an order concerning the 
relationship that the NSFO was to have in the 
division, and the role that each officer was to 
play in the ideological indoctrination of the 
troops. Witt wrote: 
52 
On orders of24.2.43 from the Reichsfi.ihrer SS 
[Himmler] concerning the ideological orientation 
of troops, I order: 
1. The leaders of the units are responsible for 
the ideological education of the officers, NCO's, 
and soldiers in their units. 
2. The co-workers of the Abt. VI will advise and 
support the commander about the 
implementation of the ideological education, will 
inform the unit officers and supply the necessary 
prepared educational materials, will give 
suggestions for the exhaustion of all possibilities 
of ideological education, ... will organize and 
oversee the care of troops (Truppenbetreuung) 
in conjunction with the Abt. Vl of the division. 5 1 
Each unit had two classes each week specifically 
for ideological training. At the end of each week, 
the unit officer was required to submit reports 
concerning the conduct of the ideological 
training. Each unit officer was also provided with 
a list of daily political questions which they were 
to use in instructing their troops. The officers 
under the Abt. VI were to aid the unit officer by 
providing them with the proper instructional 
material. Witt also appealed to the officers to 
participate regularly in the ideological 
indoctrination of the troops. They were ordered 
to attend monthly meetings with Witt for 
instruction in indoctrination, and each unit 
commander was ordered to conduct formal 
ideological training for two hours each week and 
to conduct discussions for one hour each week. 
Each Sunday they were also to conduct an 
informal "community" time where ideological 
questions were to be discussed. Finally, Witt 
urged each officer to talk about day-to-day 
ideological matters that arose at every possible 
occasion. The purpose behind this 
indoctrination was to make every man within 
the division "a convinced carrier" of the National 
Socialist ideology, and to transform the Hitler 
Youth into an SS man "who lives according to 
the fundamentals of the SS as a fanatic 
warrior. "52 
It was constantly stressed to the 12th SS 
officers that, like the WELs, ideology must 
permeate in all aspects of day-to-day life in the 
division. The progress of the ideological 
indoctrination was constantly monitored by the 
NSFO. For example, within three days of an 
ideological event being staged (like a film, a 
lecture or a theatre production) for a particular 
unit, the unit leader had to submit a "morale 
report" to the Abt. Vl outlining the strengths and 
weaknesses of the event. Aside from the usual 
questions (which unit attended, what kind of 
event was it), the officer had to indicate how the 
troops received the event (either positively or 
negatively) and if there were suggestions for 
further events. 53 
Preparing the Division for Battle 
I\ nother factor that set the 12th SS apart from 
r-liheir comrades was the scope, and the 
sometimes unorthodox nature, of their training 
once they were assembled in Beverloo. As Kurt 
Meyer stated, "training was made to approximate 
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war conditions. All exercises were conducted 
with live ammunition and with fighting weapons, 
not training weapons. The losses which thereby 
resulted had to be taken in order to avoid losses 
during action. "54 The use of live fire during 
training was certainly risky and unorthodox, but 
this type of training made the soldiers focus on 
their job and, in turn, highly motivated the 
survivors of the training. 55 In order to achieve 
the goals of toughening the recruits mentally, 
building confidence, and enhancing knowledge 
of weapons and equipment, the officers 
sometimes resorted to curious measures. For 
instance, in order to familiarize the Panzer crews 
and officers with the machines they were to take 
into battle, SS-Obersturmbannjilhrer Max 
Wi.insche, the CO of the 12th SS Panzer 
Regiment, took the soldiers to the MAN tank 
production factory in Nuremberg and had them 
work between eight and 14 days in the assembly 
area. 56 In one exercise, the CO of one infantry 
battalion required his soldiers, fully equipped 
with weapons and supplies, to leap 30 feet into 
a deep sand pit to train recruits to never hesitate 
in combat. In another demonstration, one 
instructor, in an attempt to show that grenade 
splinters only travelled laterally and upwards, 
detonated the weapon atop his head on his 
helmet. Other exercises had the youth 
disassembling and rebuilding their weapons with 
their eyes bound or while in the dark. 57 
The health of the soldiers was also 
emphasized, with the knowledge that healthy, 
well-fed soldiers would perform better in battle. 
In order to promote physical development in the 
still-growing boys, and mindful of the fact that 
active teenaged boys need an enormous amount 
of calories per day, the soldiers of the 12th SS 
received special rations, the outcome of an 
agreement between the German High Command 
and SS-Obergruppenjilhrer Oswald Pohl, the 
Chief of the SS Wirtschajts-und Verwaltungs-
hauptamt (Economic and Administrative Main 
Office). The weekly ration for each soldier 
consisted of3.5litres of fresh milk, 1, 750 grams 
ofbread, 200 grams of meat, 140 grams oflard, 
120 grams of sugar, and 245 grams of other 
nutrients, which, according to Pohl, was more 
substantial than the rations allotted to workers 
in heavy industry. 58 Instead of the cigarette ration 
that most soldiers received, the soldiers of the 
12th SS had to be content with a ration of hard 
candy until they turned 18.59 Any relationship 
54 
with a woman was strictly prohibited until the 
boy turned 18, so the soldiers were forbidden 
to patronize the local brothels. The consumption 
of alcohol was also strictly forbidden. 60 In the 
few documents that remain concerning 
discipline in the 12th SS, the evidence points to 
strict discipline against those who broke these 
rules.61 
Finally, the 12th SS also held certain 
advantages over other German units when it 
came to equipment. Although it is true that the 
12th SS struggled in obtaining some supplies, 
such as gasoline, in other ways it received more 
than what was normally allocated to divisions. 
According to Eric Lefevre, 62 a normal Panzer 
Division by 1944 had one Panzer regiment, two 
Panzer Grenadier regiments (one motorized, one 
a combination motorized and armoured), a 
reconnaissance battalion, an anti-tank battalion, 
an artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft battalion, 
an engineer battalion, and various other sub-
units (like signals, medical, etc), for a total 
strength of 14,787 officers and men. To this the 
12th SS added more men and equipment. The 
list included: an additional mortar battalion 
(Weiferabteiluung) of 24 Nebelwerfers and a 
battery of280/320 artillery; an extra company 
of 22 Panzer IV tanks (giving it a total of 182 
tanks rather than the normal160); 1,000 more 
men in each of the division's two infantry 
regiments; seven more self-propelled anti-tank 
guns than a regular Panzer division in Normandy 
in 1944 and the eventual replacement of towed 
AT guns by self-propelled PanzeTjiigers; and 
finally the engineer battalion assigned to the 12th 
SS was motorized and armoured, a luxury that 
was uncommon in comparable units. As a result 
of all this, the 12th SS ended up with a total 
strength of 19,090 men, over 4,000 more 
soldiers than what would be expected. 
The Result 
The message the 12th SS was clear and sustained, and this had an influence on their 
morale and their motivation. The division 
received more men, more heavy weapons, better 
rations, and, according to Kurt Meyer, better 
training than any other division in Normandy. 53 
The soldiers also had maintained a faith in their 
weapons, 5 4 consequently giving them enormous 
confidence going into battle. Given the previous 
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teachings that they were racially superior and 
given the martial aspect of German society and 
education, there is little doubt that most of the 
teenagers in the 12th SS would have a feeling of 
invincibility. The feelings of superiority, the esprit 
de corps, the superior training, and the 
overabundance of equipment that the 12th SS 
possessed all combined to enhance the combat 
motivation of the soldiers to a level unreached 
by other units in the European war. For the 
fanatical soldier, these tangible motivators are 
necessary in order to implement the teachings 
that the ideological indoctrination had forced 
them to internalize. It is no wonder, then, that 
the soldiers had "laughter in their eyes" and a 
"faith in their strength and the will to fight" before 
their first battle65 and why their inability to 
prevail on the battlefield led to fury spent on 
helpless prisoners. 
The story of the 12th SS is indeed a tragic 
and cautionary tale. The world view to which 
these fanatics adhered was thoroughly imbued 
with the glorification of war, and this led to 
puzzling, radical, and abominable behaviour, 
like grinding the bodies of Canadian dead under 
the tracks of their vehicles. These, though, are 
not the only examples of collective deviant 
behaviour by the members of the 12th SS. For 
example, one soldier was very upset because his 
wound came from a piece of falling brick. 
Untersturmfiihrer Gerhard Amler recalled that 
Hauptsturmfiihrer Heydrich "cried on my 
shoulder ... Not even a proper wound! How would 
it look, him standing there and having to admit 
that a chunk of brick had fallen on his head." 
However, later Heydrich could be happy because 
his arm was in a plaster cast, thereby being 
"properly wounded and would not have to be 
ashamed any longer. "66 Caught in a web of lies 
in a society that was built on them, these 
teenagers never received a reasonable 
opportunity to question what they were doing. 
What is most tragic is that these fanatical 
teenagers believed that what they were doing was 
correct. Even after the war, many believed that 
they had done nothing wrong. 
The fanaticism of the 12th SS resulted in 
the virtual annihilation of the division by the end 
of the Normandy campaign: their wish for death 
or glory met largely by a squalid burial in an 
unmarked roadside grave. Although exact 
casualty rates are unknown, it is estimated that 
only 30 per cent of the division escaped across 
the Seine in August 1944. For Canadians, the 
tragic legacy of these fanatical young soldiers lies 
in the cemeteries at Beny-sur-Mer and 
Bretteville-sur-Laize, and in the monuments to 
their brutality at the Abbey d'Ardenne and the 
Chateau d'Audrieu: mute testimony to both the 
cost of the war and the need for it in the flrst 
place. 
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